# Understanding Greek Government Debt, Debt Sustainability, and Primary Balance to Win Trust & Confidence

"Greece has among the best debt metrics and primary/fiscal balance numbers in the Eurozone"

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# Paul B. Kazarian Summary CV

- Over 100 presentations on the topic of Greek debt and debt sustainability including: AmCham, BHCC, CEPS, CESifo, CIPFA, EGPA, FEE, HBS, IIF, IFAC, INET Oxford, ISCTE, LBS, OECD, PMI Congress, S&P, and USC.
- Sole Special Advisor to the Centre for European Policy Studies Task Force on How Better Managing Government Balance Sheets Can Enhance Growth.
- Visiting Professor of Government Financial Management for 2017-2018 at the ISCTE Business School at the Instituto Universitário de Lisboa in Portugal.
- Received the <u>2016 William Pitt the Younger Award</u> for extraordinary leadership in strengthening democracy through government financial management.
- Analysis on Greek debt <u>cited in prestigious publications</u> including: HBS Case Study, InterEconomics, The Accountant, Der Spiegel, and the FT.
- Authored multiple presentations on IMF best practices not applied to Greece.
- **<u>Creator</u>** of www.MostImportantReform.info.
- Personal relationships with executives at the largest SWFs.
- As <u>CEO and CFO</u> of Fortune 300 diversified conglomerate, turned around over a dozen multinational businesses from bankruptcy to world-leading successful growth companies.
- Japonica Partners founder (est. 1988), <u>Chairman, and CEO</u>.

Understanding Greek Government Debt, Debt Sustainability, and Primary Balance to Win Trust & Confidence

- Section A: Understanding Greek Government Debt and Debt Sustainability
- Section B: Understanding Greek Government Primary Balance

Section C: Four (4) March Actions for Greece to Win the Trust & Confidence of the Global Capital Markets and Regain Market Access at Borrowing Costs Comparable to Cyprus and Portugal

# Section A: Understanding Greek Government Debt and Debt Sustainability

# Reporting Debt to Reflect Economic Reality and Win Trust & Confidence

- ALL internationally agreed accounting standards and statistics guidelines require debt stock (balance sheet) be reported to reflect economic reality.
- 2. Not seeking international comparability or accountability, Maastricht legal promulgations and IMF lender rules reflect political or lender objectives and NOT economic reality.

### Internationally Agreed Upon Accounting Standards are Absolutely Essential to Win Trust & Confidence and Unilateral Definitions Highly Counter-Productive

| SN | Benefits   | Internationally<br>Agreed Upon | Unilateral |
|----|--|--------------------------------|------------|
| 1. | Transparency   | Yes                            | No         |
| 2. | Global comparability   | Yes                            | No         |
| 3. | Historical comparability   | Yes                            | No         |
| 4. | Decision-making  | Yes                            | No         |
| 5. | Accountability   | Yes                            | No         |
| 6. | Global standardization of measuring and reporting stocks and flows | Yes                            | No         |

### Greece 2016 YE Balance Gross Sheet Debt, Correctly Calculated in Accordance with International Accounting or Statistics Rules is 75% and 91% of GDP, Respectively

(€, Billions)

|    |                        | Internationa  | Ily Agreed Up  | on Standards  | Rules Set Politically with              |            |               |
|----|------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|---|------------|---------------|
|    |                        | Designed to   | o Reflect Econ | omic Reality  | Little to No Regard to Economic Reality |            |               |
|    |                        | International | 2008 System    | European      | IMF Debt                                | I          | Lisbon Treaty |
|    |                        | Accounting    | of National    | System of     | Sustainability                          |            | Excessive     |
|    |                        | Standards     | Accounts       | Accounts 2010 | Analysis                                | IMF        | Deficit       |
|    |                        | (IPSAS/IFRS)  | (2008 SNA)     | (ESA 2010)    | (DSA)                                   | Baseline   | Procedure*    |
|    |                        | Balance       | Correctly      | Correctly     | Correctly                               | Future     | (EDP) Future  |
|    |                        | Sheet Debt    | Calculated     | Calculated    | Calculated                              | Face Value | Face Value    |
| 1. | Gross Debt             | € 132         | € 161          | € 161         | € 204                                   | € 325      | € 317         |
| 2. | Gross Debt<br>% of GDP | 75%           | 91%            | 91%           | 116%                                    | 184%       | 180%          |
| 3. | Net Debt               | € 84          | € 113          | € 113         | € 186                                   | NA         | NA            |
| 4. | Net Debt<br>% of GDP   | 48%           | 64%            | 64%           | 106%                                    | NA         | NA            |

Debt metrics for Greece EZ member state peers are not reduced under ESA 2010, 2008 SNA, or IMF DSA as there is no qualifying concessional or reorganized debt; under IPSAS/IFRS, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland would report lower debt by approximately €22 billion, €18 billion, and €11 billion, respectively.

Notes: Based on EC AMECO, Eurostat, and Bloomberg data accessed 17 Feb 2017 with percentages based on GDP of €176 billion, except IMF Baseline from Greece Article IV (Feb 2017) with percentage based on GDP of €176.6 billion. \*EC 479/2009 "Whereas (4)" states "The definition of 'debt' laid down in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure needs to be amplified by a reference to the classification codes of ESA 95".

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### Greece has Among the Best 2016 Debt to GDP Metrics in the Eurozone

|     | EZ Member State | Internationally Agreed<br>Upon Accounting<br>Standards<br><u>% of GDP</u> |
|-----|-----------------|---|
| 1.  | Estonia         | 10%   |
| 2.  | Luxembourg      | 21%   |
| 3.  | Latvia          | 39%   |
| 4.  | Lithuania       | 41%   |
| 5.  | Slovakia        | 52%   |
| 6.  | Malta           | 60%   |
| 7.  | Netherlands     | 62%   |
| 8.  | Finland         | 64%   |
| 9.  | Germany         | 68%   |
| 10. | Ireland         | 71%   |
| 11. | Greece          | 75%   |
| 12. | Slovenia        | 81%   |
| 13. | Austria         | 84%   |
| 14. | Cyprus          | 88%   |
| 15. | France          | 96%   |
| 16. | Spain           | 98%   |
| 17. | Belgium         | 107%  |
| 18. | Portugal        | 119%  |
| 19. | Italy           | 133%  |

*Notes:* EC AMECO data accessed 13 Feb 2017 except Greece, Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain calculated according to international accounting standards; adjustments to future face value include Greece (180%), Cyprus (107%), Ireland (75%), Portugal (131%), and Spain (100%).

### Illustrative Comments on Correctly Measuring Greece Debt: EU-Related

- European Stability Mechanism Managing Director Klaus Regling: "the actual cost to Greece of servicing its debt is among the lowest in Europe and will remain so for a long time. Its gross financing needs will drop in the coming years and fall well below those of most other eurozone countries by 2020" (FT, 9 Feb 2017). Greece debt ratio is meaningless (WSJ, 26 Sep 2013) given very generous concessional terms on the debt, and the debt relief should be measured using net present value. (ESM Annual Report, 18 Jun 2015)
- Germany Deputy Minister of Finance Jens Spahn: Debt burden should be assessed based on "net present value of debt" and "how much in fact does Greece have to pay per year". (Bloomberg, 2 Sep 2015)
- **3. Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel**: "It is rightful **that we do not ask about the 120% debt [to GDP] ratio**, but ask, what is the actual burden on Greece from its debt service." (Axia, 1 Sep 2015)
- 4. IMF: Given the extraordinarily concessional terms that now apply to the bulk of Greece's debt, the debt/GDP ratio is not a very meaningful proxy (Greece Preliminary DSA 26 Jun 2015). Present value of debt is the appropriate measure for non-market access countries (DSA LIC Framework, 5 Nov 2013)
- 5. CDU Economic Council: It is the present value of a loan that is decisive, not the nominal value. Greece debt is significantly lower than thought. This 'competitive edge' is kept quiet. (Letter to Members of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group, 24 Feb 2015)
- 6. Former Member of German Council of Economic Experts Beatrice Weder di Mauro: The present value of outstanding Greek debt is now about 100% of GDP. (Brookings, Sept 2015)

### **Confirmation of Incorrectly** Calculated Greek Government Debt Numbers

- "Greece's New Agreement with Europe: This Time Different?" InterEconomics. September/October 2015. Pelagidis, Theodore and Kazarian, Paul B.
- "Greece's Debt: Sustainable?" Harvard Business School Case Study. June 2015. Serafeim, George
- "The Curious Case of the Rules for Calculating Debt Relief: A Technical Note on EU Accounting for Debt, Especially Restructured and Concessional Debt." September 2015. Ball, Ian
- "Greece Needs to Be Honest About the Numbers." Harvard Business Review. September 2016. Jacobides, Michael, London Business School
- "Greece's government accounting, 'The Biggest Lie of the Century Kazarian.'" The Accountant. October 2016.
- "What if Greece got massive **debt relief but no one admitted it? (Part 2 of 7 article series)**" **Financial Times**. 9 June 2016. Klein, Matthew

See also: www.MostImportantReform.info


## Debt Measurement by International Standards/Guidelines: Summary


"The truth only counts when there are agreed rules of evidence." Financial Times, 9 October 2016.

| Standards /<br>Guidelines | Securities                            | Loans  | Rescheduled<br>Debt | Financial<br>Assets                    |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|---------------------|--|
| IPSAS                     | Amortized cost                        | Amortized cost   | Amortized cost      | All financial assets                   |
| IFRS                      | Amortized cost                        | Amortized cost   | Amortized cost      | All financial assets                   |
| 2008 SNA                  | Market value                          | Aarket value Nominal value Present value                 |                     | All financial assets incl. receivables |
| ESA 2010                  | Market value                          | Nominal value  | Present value       | All financial assets incl. receivables |
| IMF DSA                   | Concessional de<br>nominal value; req | Financial assets<br>corresponding to<br>debt instruments |                     |  |
| IMF GFSM                  | Varies FFV FFV                        |  | Varies              |  |
| EDP (Dual)                | al) FFV/PV FFV F                      |  | FFV / PV            | None                                   |


*Note:* Present value at time of transaction using market rates on commercial arms length basis. FFV is future face value.

### **Government Benchmarks** with Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Accounting Rules





### New Aspiring Government Benchmarks with Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Accounting Rules



Public Sector Benchmarks with Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Accounting Rules



European Union IPSAS European Financial Stability Facility



IFRS



IFRS



US GAAP



**IPSAS** 



IPSAS

# **IPSAS 29 / IFRS 39: Highlights**

"No material differences" between the standards on the below.

**Objective:** improves decision-making, increases transparency, strengthens accountability, and facilitates global comparability.

- **1. Initial Recognition** 
  - Fair value of debt is market value (confirming arm's length) at date of event.
  - Market price/YTM or most comparable market price/YTM.
  - If necessary, PV with maximum use of observable/prevailing market YTM.

#### 3. Concessionary Loans and Grants

- Fair value measurement.
- Recognized existence of **non-exchange transaction** as a subsidy.

#### 3. Substantial Modification

- If PV of cash flows is at least 10% different from PV of original financial liability.
- All financial liabilities utilize the same market based principles.

4. Subsequent Measurement: At amortized cost using EIR method accretion.

# **IFRS 39 Passed by EC Parliament**

The EC made the IFRS debt measurement standards **mandatory for all companies** listed on major stock exchanges in the EU from 2005. Commission Regulation (EC). No.1864/2005 of 15 November 2005.

# ESA 2010: Legal Status and Central Framework in EU

"To ensure that the concepts, methodologies, and accounting rules set out in this volume are strictly applied, it has been decided, following a proposal from the Commission, to give it a solid legal basis." ESA 2010 was thus adopted in the form of a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council dated 21 May, 2013. Page iii.

"The ESA 2010 therefore serves as the **central framework for reference for the social and economic statistics** of the EU and its member states." ESA 2010 Page 2.

"Reporting the **economic reality** where it is different from the legal form is a fundamental accounting principle to give consistency and to make sure that transactions of similar type will produce similar effects on the macroeconomic accounts, **irrespectively of the legal arrangements**." ESA 2010 Page 440.

### ESA 2010 Rules Specify that Restructured Debt is Extinguished and Revalued at Transaction Value

### **2010** Debt operations

20.221 Debt operations can be particularly important for the general government sector, as they often serve as a means for government to provide economic aid to other units. The recording of these operations is covered in Chapter 5. The general principle for any cancellation or assumption of debt of a unit by another unit, by mutual agreement, is to recognise that there is a voluntary transfer of wealth between the two units. This means that the counterpart transaction of the liability assumed or of the claim cancelled is a capital transfer. No flow of money is usually observed, this may be characterised as a capital transfer in kind.

#### Other debt restructuring

#### **SECTION 20.236**

20.236 Debt restructuring is an agreement to alter the terms and conditions for servicing an existing debt, usually on more favourable terms for the debtor. The debt instrument that is being restructured is considered to be extinguished and replaced by a new debt instrument with the new terms and conditions. If there is a difference in value between the extinguished debt instrument and the new debt instrument, it is a type of debt cancellation and a capital transfer is necessary to account for the difference.

#### **Chapter 5: Valuation**

- Financial transactions are recorded at transaction values, that is, the values in national currency at which the financial assets and/or liabilities involved are created, liquidated, exchanged or assumed between institutional units, on the basis of commercial considerations.
- 5.20 Financial transactions and their financial or nonfinancial counterpart transactions are recorded at the same transaction value. There are three possibilities:
  - (c) neither the financial transaction nor its counterpart transaction is a transaction in cash or via other means of payment: <u>the transaction</u> value is the current market value of the financial assets and/or liabilities involved.
- 5.21 The transaction value refers to a specific financial transaction and its counterpart transaction. In concept, the transaction value is to be distinguished from a value based on a price quoted on the market, a fair market price, or any price that is intended to express the generality of prices for a class of similar financial assets and/or liabilities. However, in cases where the counterpart transaction of a financial transaction is, for example, a transfer and therefore the financial transaction may be undertaken other than for purely commercial considerations, the transaction value is identified with the current market value of the financial assets and/or liabilities.

# 2008 SNA Statistical Framework Produced by Five NGOs

"It [2008 SNA] has been **produced and is released under the auspices** of the United Nations, the European Commission, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank Group." Forward.

"At its fortieth session, the Statistical commission unanimously adopted the 2008 SNA as the international statistical standard for national accounts. We encourage all countries to compile and report their national accounts on the basis of the 2008 SNA as soon as possible." Signed by BAN Ki-Moon, UN; BARROSO Jose Manuel, EC; GURRIA Angel, OECD; STRAUSS-KAHN Dominique, IMF; and ZOELLICK Robert B, World Bank. Forward.

#### Five Signatories to System of National Accounts (2008 SNA), including the European Commission and the IMF

#### Foreword

The System of National Accounts, 2008 (2008 SNA) is a statistical framework that provides a comprehensive, consistent and flexible set of macroeconomic accounts for policymaking, analysis and research purposes. It has been produced and is released under the auspices of the United Nations, the European Commission, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group. It represents an update, mandated by the United Nations Statistical Commission in 2003, of the System of National Accounts, 1993, which was produced under the joint responsibility of the same five organizations. Like earlier editions, the 2008 SNA reflects the evolving needs of its users, new developments in the economic environment and advances in methodological research.

A working group, comprising representatives of each of our organizations, managed and coordinated the work. National statistical offices and central banks from countries throughout the world made valuable contributions. Expert groups carried out research on the issues being reviewed. An advisory expert group was established to provide expert opinions from a broad range of countries. During the update work, the recommendations and the updated text were posted on the website of the United Nations Statistics Division for worldwide comment, thereby achieving full transparency in the process.

The 2008 SNA is intended for use by all countries, having been designed to accommodate the needs of countries at different stages of economic development. It also provides an overarching framework for standards in other domains of economic statistics, facilitating the integration of these statistical systems to achieve consistency with national accounts.

At its fortieth session, the Statistical Commission unanimously adopted the 2008 SNA as the international statistical standard for national accounts. We encourage all countries to compile and report their national accounts on the basis of the 2008 SNA as soon as possible.

BAN Ki-moon Secretary-General United Nations

José Manuel Barroso President European Commission



Angel Gurría Secretary-General Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

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Dominique Strauss-Kahn Managing Director International Monetary Fund

Ribert B. Joellick

Robert B. Zoellick President The World Bank Group



### 2008 SNA Rules Specify that Restructured Debt is Extinguished and Revalued at Transaction Value

#### Debt reorganization

- 22.106 There are four main types of debt reorganization:
- Debt rescheduling or re-financing. A change in the terms and conditions of the amount owed, which may result or not in <u>a reduction in burden in present value</u> terms.

#### Debt rescheduling and refinancing

22.109 <u>Debt rescheduling (or refinancing)</u> is an agreement to alter the terms and conditions for servicing an existing debt, usually on more favourable terms for the debtor. <u>Debt</u> rescheduling involves rearrangements on the same type of instrument, with the same principal value and the same creditor as with the old debt. Refinancing entails a different debt instrument, generally at a different value and may be with a creditor different than that from the old debt.

#### **SECTION 22.110**

22.110 Under both arrangements, the debt instrument that is being rescheduled is considered to be extinguished and replaced by a new debt instrument with the new terms and conditions. If there is a difference in value between the extinguished debt instrument and the new debt instrument, part is a type of debt forgiveness by government and a capital transfer is necessary to account for the difference.

- 22.111 *Debt rescheduling* is a bilateral arrangement between the debtor and the creditor that constitutes a formal deferment of debt-service payments and the application of new and generally extended maturities. The new terms normally include one or more of the following elements: extending repayment periods, reductions in the contracted interest rate, adding or extending grace periods for the repayment of principal, fixing the exchange rate at favourable levels for foreign currency debt, and rescheduling the payment of arrears, if any.
- 22.112 The treatment for debt rescheduling is that the <u>existing</u> <u>contract is extinguished</u> and a new contract created. The applicable existing debt is recorded as being repaid and a new debt instrument (or instruments) of the same type and with the same creditor is created with the new terms and conditions.
- 22.113 The transaction is recorded at the time both parties record the change in terms in their books, and is valued at the value of the new debt.

# 2060 Debt Projections are a Totally Politically Driven Number Without Substantive Meaning

- 2060 projections can be made to show debt at either a small fraction of GDP or a multiple of GDP.
- Future face value of debt is a hidden driver of the massive increase.
- Same assumptions applied to France, Italy, or Spain would lead to the same "explosive" debt increases.

|                                   | Feb 2017        | May 2016        | Jun 2015        | June 2014           |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------|
|                                   | Article IV      | DSA             | DSA             | <b>Fifth Review</b> |
|                                   | <b>Baseline</b> | <b>Baseline</b> | <b>Baseline</b> | <b>Baseline</b>     |
| Debt to GDP                       | 275%            | 250%            | 100%            | 60%                 |
| Gross Financing Needs<br>% of GDP | 62%             | 60%             | 22%             | 12%                 |
| International Accounting St       | andards (IPSA   | S/IFRS) Baland  | ce Sheet Debt   | Numbers:            |
|                                   |                 | <u>YE 2016</u>  | <u>YE 2015</u>  | <u>YE 2014</u>      |
| Debt to GDP                       |                 | 75%             | 71%             | 70%                 |

*Notes:* IMF data from sources as noted. International Accounting Standards (IPSAS/IFRS) Balance Sheet Debt calculated according to international accounting standards based on EC AMECO and Greece MoF data accessed 13 Feb 2017.

### Greece has a Competitive Advantage When Gross Financing Needs (GFN) is Correctly Calculated and Managed

IMF GFN definition and 15% to 20% targets are not based on internationally agreed upon standards but solely derived by the IMF.

|    |   | 2016<br>GFN<br><u>% of GDP</u> |
|----|---|--------------------------------|
| 1. | IMF   | 17.3%                          |
| 2. | Correctly Calculated According to ESM Definition            | 12.7%                          |
| 3. | Correctly Calculated According to ESM Definition - Adjusted | 5.2%                           |

*Notes:* Correctly Calculated based on EC AMECO and Bloomberg data accessed 13 Feb 2017; IMF from Feb 2017 Greece Article IV. Adjusted GFN assumes T-Bills refinanced at five year market yield except Greece at ESM rate of 1% with 10 year even amortization.

### ESM's Regling is Correct: Greece Has Among the Lowest 2016 Debt Metrics Compared to Peers and Now it is About Winning the Trust & Confidence of the Global Capital Markets

(% of GDP except Avg. Maturity of Debt)

|                                | Greece | Peer<br><u>Average</u> | <u>Cyprus</u> | Ireland | <u>Italy</u> | <u>Portugal</u> | <u>Spain</u> |
|--------------------------------|--------|------------------------|---------------|---------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|
| 1. Balance Sheet Net Debt      | 48%    | 70%                    | 47%           | 43%     | 113%         | 79%             | 70%          |
| 2. Balance Sheet Debt          | 75%    | 102%                   | 88%           | 71%     | 133%         | 119%            | 98%          |
| 3. Cash Interest               | 2.5%   | 3.2%                   | 2.8%          | 2.3%    | 3.9%         | 4.3%            | 2.8%         |
| 4. Debt Service                | 6.6%   | 10.3%                  | 7.7%          | 5.2%    | 15.0%        | 10.6%           | 12.9%        |
| 5. GFN                         | 12.7%  | 14.0%                  | 7.1%          | 4.2%    | 20.6%        | 16.2%           | 22.1%        |
| 6. GFN - Adjusted              | 5.2%   | 9.6%                   | 5.2%          | 3.9%    | 14.1%        | 9.6%            | 15.5%        |
| 7. Avg. Maturity of Debt (Yrs) | 25.5   | 9.6                    | 9.7           | 14.0    | 6.7          | 10.7            | 6.9          |
| 8. Interest Expense (ESA)      | 3.3%   | 3.2%                   | 2.8%          | 2.3%    | 3.9%         | 4.3%            | 2.8%         |

Notes: Based on EC AMECO data accessed 13 Feb 2017. Balance Sheet Debt calculated according to international accounting standards; Balance Sheet Net Debt net of estimated financials assets based on Eurostat data accessed 13 Feb 2017. Greece Cash Interest is AMECO less EFSF deferred (non-cash) interest of an estimated €1.2 billion and SMP/ANFA rebates of €0.4 billion. Adjusted GFN assumes T-Bills refinanced at five year market yield except Greece at ESM rate of 1% with 10 year even amortization.

# Section B: Understanding Greek Government Primary Balance

[In Progress – Expected Completion March/April 2017]

# 2016 Greece Primary Balance as a Percentage of GDP

| 0.8%       | 2.3%        | 3.0%       | $\rightarrow$ | 3.4%      |
|------------|-------------|------------|---------------|-----------|
| EDP Form   | EC          | Internal   |               | Excluding |
| 13/10/2016 | Winter 2017 | Government |               | Dec 2016  |
|            | Forecast    | Estimate   |               | Christmas |
|            |             | Feb 2017   |               | Bonus     |
|            |             |            |               |           |

### Greece 2016 Primary and Fiscal Balance Rankings Have Improved Since 2014 to be Among the Best in the Eurozone

| Primary Balance % of GDP |                |             |             |             | Fiscal Balance % of GDP |             |             |  |  |
|--------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|
| 2016                     |                |             |             | 2016        |                         |             |             |  |  |
| <u>Rank</u>              | <u>Country</u> | <u>2016</u> | <u>2014</u> | <u>Rank</u> | <u>Country</u>          | <u>2016</u> | <u>2014</u> |  |  |
| 1                        | Cyprus         | 2.5%        | -6.0%       | 1           | Luxembourg              | 1.6%        | 1.5%        |  |  |
| 2                        | Greece         | 2.3%        | 0.4%        | 2           | Germany                 | 0.6%        | 0.3%        |  |  |
| 3                        | Portugal       | 2.1%        | -2.3%       | 3           | Estonia                 | 0.1%        | 0.7%        |  |  |
| 4                        | Luxembourg     | 2.0%        | 1.9%        | 4           | Latvia                  | 0.0%        | -1.6%       |  |  |
| 5                        | Germany        | 2.0%        | 2.1%        | 5           | Cyprus                  | 0.0%        | -8.8%       |  |  |
| 6                        | Italy          | 1.7%        | 1.6%        | 6           | Netherlands             | -0.1%       | -2.3%       |  |  |
| 7                        | Malta          | 1.5%        | 0.8%        | 7           | Greece (Adjusted)       | -0.4%       | -2.8%       |  |  |
| 8                        | Ireland        | 1.4%        | 0.1%        | 7           | Lithuania               | -0.4%       | -0.7%       |  |  |
| 9                        | Latvia         | 1.2%        | -0.1%       | 8           | Malta                   | -0.7%       | -2.0%       |  |  |
| 10                       | Lithuania      | 1.1%        | 0.9%        | 9           | Ireland                 | -0.9%       | -3.7%       |  |  |
| 11                       | Netherlands    | 1.0%        | -0.8%       | 10          | Greece                  | -1.1%       | -3.6%       |  |  |
| 12                       | Austria        | 0.8%        | -0.3%       | 11          | Austria                 | -1.4%       | -2.7%       |  |  |
| 13                       | Slovenia       | 0.8%        | -1.9%       | 12          | Slovenia                | -2.0%       | -5.0%       |  |  |
| 14                       | Estonia        | 0.2%        | 0.8%        | 13          | Finland                 | -2.2%       | -3.2%       |  |  |
| 15                       | Belgium        | -0.3%       | 0.2%        | 14          | Slovakia                | -2.2%       | -2.7%       |  |  |
| 16                       | Slovakia       | -0.7%       | -0.8%       | 15          | Italy                   | -2.3%       | -3.0%       |  |  |
| 17                       | Finland        | -1.1%       | -1.9%       | 16          | Portugal                | -2.3%       | -7.2%       |  |  |
| 18                       | France         | -1.5%       | -1.8%       | 17          | Belgium                 | -2.9%       | -3.1%       |  |  |
| 19                       | Spain          | -1.9%       | -2.5%       | 18          | France                  | -3.3%       | -4.0%       |  |  |
|                          |                |             |             | 19          | Spain                   | -4.7%       | -6.0%       |  |  |

*Notes:* EC AMECO data accessed 13 Feb 2017; Greece (Adjusted) is AMECO less EFSF deferred (non-cash) interest of an estimated €1.2 billion (2016) and €1.3 billion (2014).

### IMF's 2016 Primary Balance Numbers are the Most Pessimistic for Greece and Among the Least for France and Belgium

|     | <u>Country</u> | <u>EC</u>     | <u>IMF</u>   | <b>Difference</b> |  |
|-----|----------------|---------------|--------------|-------------------|--|
|     |                | (13 Feb 2017) | (6 Feb 2017) |                   |  |
| 1.  | Cyprus         | 2.5%          | 2.0%         | -0.5%             |  |
| 2.  | Greece         | 2.3%          | 0.9%         | -1.4%             |  |
| 3.  | Portugal       | 2.1%          | 1.3%         | -0.8%             |  |
| 4.  | Luxembourg     | 2.0%          | 1.2%         | -0.9%             |  |
| 5.  | Germany        | 2.0%          | 1.2%         | -0.8%             |  |
| 6.  | Italy          | 1.7%          | 1.3%         | -0.4%             |  |
| 7.  | Malta          | 1.5%          | 1.5%         | 0.0%              |  |
| 8.  | Ireland        | 1.4%          | 1.3%         | -0.1%             |  |
| 9.  | Latvia         | 1.2%          | -0.2%        | -1.4%             |  |
| 10. | Lithuania      | 1.1%          | 1.1%         | 0.0%              |  |
| 11. | Netherlands    | 1.0%          | -0.2%        | -1.2%             |  |
| 12. | Austria        | 0.8%          | 0.2%         | -0.6%             |  |
| 13. | Slovenia       | 0.8%          | 0.3%         | -0.5%             |  |
| 14. | Estonia        | 0.2%          | 0.1%         | -0.2%             |  |
| 15. | Belgium        | -0.3%         | -0.5%        | -0.1%             |  |
| 16. | Slovakia       | -0.7%         | -1.1%        | -0.3%             |  |
| 17. | Finland        | -1.1%         | -2.2%        | -1.1%             |  |
| 18. | France         | -1.5%         | -1.5%        | -0.1%             |  |
| 19. | Spain          | -1.9%         | -2.0%        | -0.1%             |  |

*Notes:* EC data from AMECO database accessed 13 Feb 2017; IMF data from WEO Oct 2016 database except Greece from Article IV (Feb 2017).

# The EC's 2017 Greece Projections for Primary and Fiscal Balance are Among the Best in the Eurozone

| Primary Balance % of GDP |                |             |             | Fiscal Balance % of G | DP          |
|--------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|
| <u>Rank</u>              | <u>Country</u> | <u>2017</u> | <u>Rank</u> | <u>Country</u>        | <u>2017</u> |
| 1                        | Portugal       | 2.5%        | 1           | Germany               | 0.4%        |
| 2                        | Greece         | 2.2%        | 2           | Greece (Adjusted)     | 0.3%        |
| 3                        | Cyprus         | 2.2%        | 2           | Netherlands           | 0.2%        |
| 4                        | Germany        | 1.6%        | 3           | Luxembourg            | 0.2%        |
| 5                        | Italy          | 1.5%        | 4           | Cyprus                | -0.2%       |
| 6                        | Ireland        | 1.5%        | 5           | Estonia               | -0.5%       |
| 7                        | Malta          | 1.4%        | 6           | Lithuania             | -0.6%       |
| 8                        | Netherlands    | 1.2%        | 7           | Malta                 | -0.6%       |
| 9                        | Slovenia       | 0.9%        | 8           | Ireland               | -0.7%       |
| 10                       | Austria        | 0.9%        | 9           | Latvia                | -1.0%       |
| 11                       | Lithuania      | 0.9%        | 10          | Greece                | -1.1%       |
| 12                       | Luxembourg     | 0.5%        | 11          | Austria               | -1.2%       |
| 13                       | Belgium        | 0.2%        | 12          | Slovakia              | -1.4%       |
| 14                       | Latvia         | 0.1%        | 13          | Slovenia              | -1.7%       |
| 15                       | Slovakia       | 0.0%        | 14          | Portugal              | -2.0%       |
| 16                       | Estonia        | -0.4%       | 15          | Belgium               | -2.2%       |
| 17                       | Spain          | -0.8%       | 16          | Finland               | -2.3%       |
| 18                       | France         | -1.1%       | 17          | Italy                 | -2.4%       |
| 19                       | Finland        | -1.2%       | 18          | France                | -2.9%       |
|                          |                |             | 19          | Spain                 | -3.5%       |

*Notes:* EC AMECO data accessed 13 Feb 2017; Greece (Adjusted) is AMECO less EFSF deferred (non-cash) interest of an estimated €1.2 billion and an estimated SMP/ANFA rebate of €1.4 billion.

### Greece January 2017 State Primary and Fiscal Balances Significantly Exceed January 2016 Excluding EU Public Investment Net Flows

(€, Millions)

|  | <u>2017</u> | <u>2016</u> | <u>% Change</u> |
|--|-------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Primary Balance                                    | € 1,012     | € 1,003     | 1%              |
| Primary Balance w/o EU Public Investment Net Flows | € 956       | € 568       | 68%             |
|  |             |             |                 |
| Fiscal Balance                                     | € 832       | € 888       | -6%             |
| Fiscal Balance w/o EU Public Investment Net Flows  | € 776       | € 453       | 71%             |
|  |             |             |                 |
| EU Public Investment Net Flows                     | € 56        | € 435       | -87%            |

### Preliminary Select Revenue/Expense Guideline Examples

To properly analyse 2016 primary balance components, it is important to understand 2014 components.

|    |   | Symmetrical Treatment<br>as Revenue and Expense |                            |           |  |
|----|---|---|----------------------------|-----------|--|
| SN |   | Statistics<br>(ESA 2010/<br>2008 SNA)           | Accounting<br>(IPSAS/IFRS) | EDP       |  |
| 1. | BOG Dividends   | Revenue   | Revenue                    | No Impact |  |
| 2. | ANFA/SMP Rebates  | Revenue   | Revenue                    | No Impact |  |
| 3. | Starting Point to End Point<br>Arrears Changes<br>(Accounts Payables) | Expense   | Expense                    | Expense   |  |
| 4. | IMF Capital   | No Impact                                       | No Impact                  | No Impact |  |
| 5. | Starting Point to End Point<br>Tax Arrears<br>(Receivables)           | TBD   | Revenue                    | No Impact |  |
| 6. | Non-Recurring 2016<br>Christmas Bonus                                 | Expense   | Expense                    | Expense   |  |

# Examples of Revenue Bounce from Economic Resurgence

- Construction rebirth.
- Real estate property appreciation.
- Stock market appreciation.
- Increase in profits and income.
- Consumption increases.

### Real Estate Values Have the Potential to Increase over 50% when Government Bond Yields Decline to Portugal, Reducing NPLs

| Recent V                        | /alue   |  | € 145,000<br>€ 16,000  |  |  |
|---------------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| 10-Year<br>Gov't Bond<br>Yields | Real Estate<br>Risk Premium   | Rate of<br>Return  | f Real Estate  | % Increase<br>from<br>Current Value  |  |
| 8%                              | 3%  | 11%  | € 145,000  | NA   |  |
| 7%                              | 3%  | 10%  | € 160,000  | 10%  |  |
| 6%                              | 3%  | 9%   | € 178,000  | 23%  |  |
| 5%                              | 3%  | 8%   | € 200,000  | 38%  |  |
| 4%                              | 3%  | 7%   | € 229,000  | 58%  |  |
| 3%                              | 2%  | 5%   | € 320,000  | 121%   |  |
| 2%                              | 2%  | 4%   | € 400,000  | 176%   |  |
| · · ·                           | Recent V<br>Annual R<br>10-Year<br>Gov't Bond<br>Yields<br>8%<br>7%<br>6%<br>6%<br>5%<br>4%<br>3% | 10-Year         Real Estate           Gov't Bond         Real Estate           Yields         3%           7%         3%           6%         3%           5%         3%           4%         3%           3%         2% | Recent Value<br>Annual Rental Income10-Year<br>Gov't Bond<br>YieldsRequire<br>Rate of<br>Real Estate<br>Risk Premium8%3%10%6%3%10%5%3%3%7%3%5%3%5% | € 145,000 $€ 145,000$ $€ 16,000$ $€ 16,000$ $€ 16,000$ $€ 16,000$ $€ 16,000$ $€ 16,000$ $€ 16,000$ $€ 145,000$ $60'' € 160,000$ $7%$ $3%$ $10%$ $€ 145,000$ $7%$ $3%$ $11%$ $€ 145,000$ $7%$ $3%$ $11%$ $€ 145,000$ $7%$ $3%$ $11%$ $€ 145,000$ $7%$ $3%$ $11%$ $€ 145,000$ $7%$ $3%$ $11%$ $€ 145,000$ $7%$ $3%$ $11%$ $€ 145,000$ $6%$ $160,000$ $6%$ $160,000$ $6%$ $178,000$ $3%$ $3%$ $6$ |  |

*Note*: Real Estate Value is Annual Rental Income divided by the Cap Rate.

### Re-Composition of Revenue Due to Economic Growth: Illustrative Year

(€, Billions)

Without a change in primary balance as a percentage of GDP, in a growth year, there is the potential to reduce regressive indirect taxes as direct taxes increase resulting from economic growth.

|                       |                      |      |             |      | <u>Cha</u>    | inge    |
|-----------------------|----------------------|------|-------------|------|---------------|---------|
|                       | <b>Baseline Year</b> |      | Growth Year |      | <u>Amount</u> | Percent |
| Total Revenue         | € 90                 | 100% | € 90        | 100% | € 0           | 0%      |
| Indirect Taxes        | € 32                 | 36%  | € 29        | 32%  | (-€3)         | -10%    |
| Direct Taxes          | € 17                 | 19%  | € 20        | 22%  | €3            | 16%     |
| Social Contributions  | € 27                 | 30%  | € 27        | 30%  | €0            | 0%      |
| Other Current Revenue | €5                   | 6%   | €5          | 6%   | € 0           | 0%      |
| Sales                 | €5                   | 6%   | €5          | 6%   | €0            | 0%      |
| Capital Revenue       | €4                   | 4%   | €4          | 4%   | €0            | 0%      |

# GDP Growth Creates Significant Additional Government Revenue

(€, Billions)

|                              | <u>2016</u> | <u>2017</u> | <u>2018</u> |
|------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| GDP                          | € 176.3     | € 183.4     | € 191.3     |
| Revenue (% of GDP)           | 50.1%       | 48.7%       | 47.7%       |
| Revenue                      | € 88.3      | € 89.4      | € 91.2      |
| Cumulative Change in Revenue |             | € 1.1       | € 2.9       |

# **Section C:**

Four (4) March Actions for Greece to Win the Trust & Confidence of the Global Capital Markets and Regain Market Access at Borrowing Costs Comparable to Cyprus and Portugal Four (4) March Actions for Greece to Win the Trust & Confidence of the Global Capital Markets and Regain Market Access at Borrowing Costs Comparable to Cyprus and Portugal

- #1. Start communicating Greece financial competitive advantage and Greece debt is sustainable.
- #2. Select and communicate the right role model countries.
- #3. Appoint a best in world financial management professional individual.
- #4. Commit to publish a consolidated government balance sheet with timeline.

## Action #1. Start Communicating Greece Financial Competitive Advantage and Greece Debt is Sustainable

- Publicly and truthfully communicate the Greece competitive financial advantage and that Greece debt is sustainable to win the trust & confidence of and facilitate the return to capital markets.
- Calculate and communicate debt, net debt, interest expense, debt service, gross financing needs, and average maturities of debt metrics in accordance with internationally agreed upon standards and rules.
- Think of this as using the same rules used by the world's leading governments, non-governmental organizations, and companies to provide a true and fair picture of economic reality.

# Action #2. Select and Communicate the Right Role Model Countries

- Publicly confirm government's role model countries, which have the best prosperity rankings, credit ratings, and financial management to win the trust & confidence of global capital markets.
- Role model countries should be (prosperity index ranking of 149 countries and highest credit ratings in parentheses): New Zealand (1st/AAA), Switzerland (4th/AAA), Canada (5th/AAA), and the United Kingdom (10th/AA).
- Think of this as advising a young member of your family to pick the right role models in order to be the best they can be in life.

# Action #3. Appoint a Best in World Financial Management Professional Individual

- Appoint professional individual considered among the best in the world in financial management and government financial reporting to senior position in the government who can win the trust & confidence of the global capital markets.
- Appoint individual with decades of success in winning trust & confidence of key stakeholders, including citizens, institutions, and capital markets.
- Appoint individual solely based on merit without regard to political affiliation, race, color, religion, gender, or national origin.
- Appoint individual with no political agenda or intention to make career in Greek politics.
- Test of success will be decline in Greek government's borrowing costs within 30 days following the appointment.
- Think of this as hiring a best in world football coach who has won one or more World Cup championships with previously underperforming teams.

## Action #4. Commit to Publish a Consolidated Government Balance Sheet with Timeline

- Publicly confirm commitment to publish a preliminary government balance sheet in accordance with international public sector accounting standards to help win the trust & confidence of the global capital markets.
- A preliminary balance sheet identifying the largest and most important assets and liabilities will show the most important financial information that is essential to win the trust & confidence of Greek taxpayers and the global capital markets.
- A proper balance sheet is an excellent tool to combat corruption and improve the value of public assets for the benefit of all Greeks.
- A proper balance sheet also protects against untruthful and hurtful rumors started by those hostile to the best interests of Greece.
- Think of this as having a passport to the global capital markets.

# Paul B. Kazarian Bloomberg TV and Radio: 15 February 2017

- **Bloomberg TV:** Japonica's Kazarian Says Politics Drives Greek Crisis
  - <u>https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2017-02-15/japonica-s-kazarian-says-politics-drives-greek-crisis</u>
  - <u>https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/videos/2017-02-15/japonica-ceo-sees-mercenary-market-embracing-trump</u>
  - <u>https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2017-02-15/gilbert-investors-</u> seek-insurance-against-le-pen

# **Bloomberg Radio:** Kazarian - Dialogue Around Greek Bail-Out is Not Based on Facts

• <u>https://www.bloomberg.com/news/audio/2017-02-15/kazarian-dialogue-around-greek-bail-out-is-not-based-on-facts</u>

### Understanding Greek Government Debt, Debt Sustainability, and Primary Balance to Win Trust & Confidence

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